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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 15-3604 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
KEVIN BARNES, 
 
Appellant 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware 
In (D. Del. No. 1-14-cr-00047-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Richard G. Andrews 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 19, 2016 
 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge,1 RENDELL and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 26, 2017) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Judge McKee concluded his term as Chief of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on 
September 30, 2016. 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute 
binding precedent.  
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McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 Kevin Barnes appeals the judgment of sentence the United States District Court for 
the District of Delaware imposed after accepting Barnes’s guilty plea.  Barnes pled guilty 
to all three counts of an indictment pursuant to a plea agreement and was sentenced to 80 
months imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release.   The terms of the plea 
agreement provided that Barnes would waive his right to appeal with certain specified 
exceptions.2  For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.  
I. 
 We first address the Anders Brief and accompanying Motion to Withdraw3 Barnes’s 
counsel has filed.  In reviewing such a motion, we are required to determine “(1) whether 
counsel[’s] [brief] adequately fulfill[s] [Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a)’s] 
requirements; and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any 
nonfrivolous issues.”4  Defense counsel’s brief must “(1) satisfy the court that counsel has 
thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues, and (2) explain why the 
issues are frivolous.”5  If we are convinced that counsel’s brief satisfies the requirements 
of Rule 109.2(a), identified all appealable issues, and explained why those issues are 
                                                 
2 These exceptions were outlined in paragraph 13 of the plea agreement, which provided as 
follows: “Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Defendant reserves his right (1) to file an appeal or 
other collateral motion on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) 
to appeal his sentence if: (a) the government appeals from the sentence, (b) the Defendant’s 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense set forth in the United States Code, or (c) 
the sentence unreasonably exceeds the Sentencing Guidelines range determined by the District 
Court in applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines.”   
3 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
4 United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  
5 Id. 
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frivolous, we conduct our own review of the record.  Our independent review is confined 
“to those portions of the record identified by an adequate Anders brief . . . [and] those issues 
raised in Appellant’s pro se brief.”6 
 Counsel’s Brief satisfies Rule 109.2(a).  It identifies a potentially appealable issue—
“whether the sentence imposed by the District Court was procedurally and substantively 
reasonable”—and determines that the issue would be frivolous.  The Brief adequately 
discusses our precedent and any relevant cases from the Supreme Court, and it applies the 
law to the facts of this case. 
 Therefore, we will grant counsel’s Motion to Withdraw. 
II. 
 In his briefs,7 Barnes alleges that he was provided with ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Subsumed in that ineffective assistance claim are Barnes’s arguments that counsel 
did not adequately inform him of potential grounds for a sentencing departure, and did not 
raise duress or mitigating factors at sentencing; that counsel did not advise Barnes of the 
availability of a possible justification defense (and did not raise that defense);8 and that 
                                                 
6 Id. at 301. 
7 Barnes filed his first Opening Brief on April 11, 2106.  After the Government filed its Response 
on May 13, 2016, Barnes filed another Brief on June 23, 2016, which we will construe as a Reply. 
For clarity, we will consider the arguments in both briefs together.  
8 On this issue, we explained in United States v. Paolello: “[I]n a criminal case, a justification 
defense is dependent upon the defendant not having recklessly placed himself in a situation in 
which he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct.”  951 F.2d 537, 541 (3d Cir. 1991).  We 
note that during the District Court guilty plea colloquy, Barnes admitted that he possessed three 
handguns because he kept a large amount of heroin in his home and needed protection.   
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counsel labored under a conflict of interest. 9  Barnes also argues that his right to due 
process of law was denied. 
 When deciding whether a waiver of appellate rights—like the one in Barnes’s plea 
agreement—bars an appeal, we consider: “(1) whether the waiver ‘of the right to appeal 
[his] sentence was knowing and voluntary;’ (2) ‘whether one of the specific exceptions set 
forth in the agreement prevents the enforcement of the waiver,’ i.e., what is the scope of 
the waiver and does it bar appellate review of the issue pressed by the defendant; and (3) 
‘whether enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.’”10  
  Though Barnes argues to the contrary, his plea agreement does include a waiver of 
the right to appeal, with specified exceptions.  Barnes was specifically informed that the 
plea agreement contained a clause (Paragraph 13) wherein he agreed to forego his right to 
appeal, except in the limited circumstances specified in that paragraph.  
 The sentencing transcript confirms his acceptance of the plea agreement terms.11 
Barnes assured the District Court that his plea was voluntary and stated that he had read 
                                                 
9 Although it is not altogether clear, it appears that the conflict of interest claim is asserted as a 
reason for counsel’s purported ineffective assistance.  See Opening Br., at 10.  (“Counsel . . . had 
a choice to pursue the justification defense in addition to pursuing the mitigation argument, but 
failed to do so.  There is no reasonable argument as to why Counsel failed to effectively represent 
the interests of Appellant therefore supporting that Counsel had a conflict of interest. . . .”).  Barnes 
asserts that counsel’s failure to present the justification defense on his behalf constitutes a conflict 
of interest.  However, he has not pointed to any plausible alternative defense strategy and we see 
nothing on this record that would even suggest that his attorney failed to pursue a given strategy 
because of conflicting loyalties or interests.  See United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1070–
71 (3d Cir. 1988).  Moreover, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not considered on direct 
appeal.  See United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2003).  
10 United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 536 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 
523 F.3d 234, 243–44 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
11 App., at 23–30.   
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the plea agreement and had no questions about it.12  During the change of plea colloquy, 
the District Court had the Assistant United States Attorney go over the terms of that 
agreement, paragraph by paragraph.13   In doing so, the A.U.S.A. quoted key provisions of 
Paragraph 13, and Barnes confirmed that he understood the agreement.14  We therefore 
conclude that Barnes’s waiver was knowing and voluntary, and our review of the record 
also satisfies us that no miscarriage of justice will result from enforcing it.15 
 According to the plea agreement, Barnes did not waive his right to allege that 
counsel was ineffective.  However, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, like those 
Barnes attempts to raise in his pro se briefs, are not normally cognizable on direct appeal.   
They must, instead, be raised in a collateral proceeding.16  We explained the reason for this 
in United States v. Thornton.17  Accordingly, we will not now consider Barnes’ ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.  
 We note, however, that one of Barnes’s allegations is that counsel was ineffective 
for “not informing [him] that the 5K2.12 was an available argument for a downward 
departure.”  In doing so, he notes:  “I did not waive any rights . . . to argue for a downward 
                                                 
12 Id.  
13 Id. 
14 Id.    
15 See Goodson, 544 F.3d at 540–41 n.11; United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 561–63 (3d Cir. 
2001) (outlining factors a court should consider when reviewing a waiver: “[t]he clarity of the 
error, its gravity, its character . . . , the impact of the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting 
the error on the government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result”). 
16 United States v. Haywood, 155 F.3d 674, 678 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel generally are not entertained on direct appeal. We have repeatedly held that the proper 
avenue for pursuing such claims is through a collateral proceeding in which the factual basis for 
the claim may be developed.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).   
17 327 F.3d 268, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2003); Haywood, 155 F.3d at 678. 
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departure, therefore my counsel did not adequately represent my interests by failing to 
argue or present the argument for a 5K2.12 departure.”  To the extent that he is challenging 
the denial of a 5K2.12 departure, he is asking us to review his sentence, but the 
circumstances specified in his plea agreement that would allow such an appeal are absent.  
The same is true of Barnes’s claim that counsel was ineffective for not raising duress or 
mitigating factors at sentencing.  To the extent that he is challenging his sentence, the claim 
has been waived.  To the extent that he is arguing that his attorney was ineffective, the 
claim will not be addressed on direct appeal.  
 Barnes also claims that he was denied due process, but it is not clear whether he is 
asserting a substantive or procedural due process claim apart from a challenge to his 
sentence, or whether he is asserting that claim within the context of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.   In his Reply pro se Brief, he states: “I feel denial of effective 
assistance of counsel has violated my due process rights under the Fifth Amendment 
because my counsel’s failure to properly investigate and present mitigating evidence to 
either the court or to the Government.”18  Notwithstanding Barnes’s citation to the Fifth 
Amendment (due process clause), the context of that assertion suggests that it is a Sixth 
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  As we have already explained, we 
will not address an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. Moreover, our 
examination of the record establishes that there was no procedural error in imposing 
                                                 
18 Reply pro se Br., at 8.   
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sentence, and the 80-month sentence is reasonable under all of the circumstances and, thus, 
not a denial of substantive due process.19 
III. 
 For the reasons stated above, we will grant counsel’s Motion to Withdraw and 
affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence. 
 
                                                 
19 Barnes further insists that the District Court erred “by sentencing [him] without properly 
following the procedures set forth in [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 32” because he was not 
“given a copy of his [presentence report] until the morning of sentencing.”  But at his sentencing, 
he swore before the District Court that he had read the PSR, discussed it with his attorney, and had 
told his attorney everything that he wanted to about the PSR.  Accordingly, the fact that Barnes 
himself may not have received the PSR until the morning of the sentencing provides no basis for 
relief.  To the extent that Barnes raises this issue as a procedural due process claim, our review of 
the sentencing proceeding establishes that any such claim would be without merit.  
